Facts and Values

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Cognitivist Expressivism
Confer
Conferred Status
descriptive normative distinction
empiricism
epistemological
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Error Theory
Evaluative Beliefs
Evaluative Facts
Evaluative Knowledge
Evaluative Properties
Evolutionary Debunking Argument
fact-value dichotomy
Follow
Frege Geach Problem
Good Life
Hilary Putnam
Intersubjective Deliberation
judicial decision reasoning
Legal Precepts
metaethics
moral epistemology
Moral Facts
moral objectivity
Moral Principles
naturalism
normativity
objectivity
pragmatic constructivism in philosophy
Pragmatic Constructivists
prospective rationality
Putnam 2016a
Rational Self-management
rationality
Reasonable Foreseeability
Reflective Endorsement
relativism
science and ethics interface
Sentimental Realism
social theory philosophy
Super-imposed
value pluralism
Vice Versa
Violates

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138955516
  • Weight: 566g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 06 Dec 2016
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This collection offers a synoptic view of current philosophical debates concerning the relationship between facts and values, bringing together a wide spectrum of contributors committed to testing the validity of this dichotomy, exploring alternatives, and assessing their implications. The assumption that facts and values inhabit distinct, unbridgeable conceptual and experiential domains has long dominated scientific and philosophical discourse, but this separation has been seriously called into question from a number of corners. The original essays here collected offer a diversity of responses to fact-value dichotomy, including contributions from Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam who are rightly credited with revitalizing philosophical interest in this alleged opposition. Both they, and many of our contributors, are in agreement that the relationship between epistemic developments and evaluative attitudes cannot be framed as a conflict between descriptive and normative understanding. Each chapter demonstrates how and why contrapositions between science and ethics, between facts and values, and between objective and subjective are false dichotomies. Values cannot simply be separated from reason. Facts and Values will therefore prove essential reading for analytic and continental philosophers alike, for theorists of ethics and meta-ethics, and for philosophers of economics and law.

Giancarlo Marchetti is Associate Professor at the Università degli studi di Perugia, Italy. He is the author of Il neo-pragmatismo (1999) and Verità e valori. Tra pragmatismo e filosofia analitica (2008), and co-editor of Il Pragmatismo. Dalle origini agli sviluppi contemporanei (2015). Sarin Marchetti is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Sapienza Università di Roma, Italy. He is the author of Ethics and Philosophical Critique in William James (2015) and William James (2017), and co-editor of Pragmatism and the European Traditions: Encounters with Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology Before the Great Divide (2017).