Financial Stability Without Central Banks
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A01=George Selgin
Author_George Selgin
Category=KCA
Category=KCBM
Category=KCS
Category=KFFK
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
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Product details
- ISBN 9780255367523
- Dimensions: 130 x 198mm
- Publication Date: 04 Jan 2018
- Publisher: Institute of Economic Affairs
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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George Selgin is one of the world's foremost monetary historians. In this book, based on the 2016 Hayek Memorial Lecture, he shows how a system of private banks without a central bank can bring about financial stability through self-regulation. If one bank stretches credit too far, it will be reined in by the others before the system as a whole gets out of control. The banks have a strong incentive to ensure an orderly resolution if a particular bank is facing insolvency or illiquidity.
Selgin draws on evidence from the era of 'free banking' in Scotland and Canada. These arrangements enjoyed greater financial stability, with fewer banking crises, than the English system with its central bank and the US model with its faulty government regulation. The creation of the Federal Reserve appears to have increased the frequency of financial crises.
The book also includes commentaries by Kevin Dowd and Mathieu Bedard. Dowd asks whether free-banking systems should be underpinned by a gold standard,which he regards as a tried-and-tested institution at the heart of their success. Bedard challenges the assumption that the banking sector is inherently unstable and therefore requires state intervention. He argues that increases in government control have made the banking system more prone to crisis.
George Selgin is Director of the Cato Institute's Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives. He is a Senior Affiliated Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Professor Emeritus at the University of Georgia.
