Freedom of the Will

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A01=Ferenc Huoranszki
action
Actual Intentional Control
Agent's Rational Capacities
Agent’s Rational Capacities
Akratic Agents
analysis
argument
Author_Ferenc Huoranszki
Backup Factor
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTK
Category=QDTM
Category=QDTQ
Commonsense Psychological Explanation
conditional
Conditional Analysis
conditional analysis of moral responsibility
consequence
Consequence Argument
determinism
determinism and responsibility
dispositional properties
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Fi Rst Order Desire
Follow
Frankfurt Type Cases
Frankfurt's Argument
Frankfurt's Examples
Frankfurt’s Argument
Frankfurt’s Examples
Free Will
Fundamental Physical Level
G.E. Moore
Metaphysics
metaphysics of agency
Moorean Analysis
moral
moral psychology
Moral Responsibility
physical
Physical Determinism
Psychological Ability
Psychological Determinism
rational action theory
Rational Self-control
Reasons Dependence
Relevant Ability
Relevant Choice
responsibility
self-determination philosophy
Simple Conditional Analysis
unperformed
Unperformed Action
Van Inwagen
Van Inwagen's Argument
Van Inwagen’s Argument

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415879477
  • Weight: 560g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 08 Nov 2010
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Freedom of the Will provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of dispositions.

The original analysis can be amended so that the revised conditional account is not only a good response to determinist worries about the possibility of free will, but it can also explain the sense in which free will is an important condition of moral responsibility. This study addresses three fundamental issues about free will as a metaphysical condition of responsibility. First, the book explains why agents are responsible for their actions or omissions only if they have the ability to do otherwise and shows that the relevant ability is best captured by the revised conditional analysis. Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents’ free will and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a condition of responsibility must be understood in terms of agents’ ability to do otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to respond to reasons. Finally, the book explains in which sense responsibility requires self-determination and argues that it is compatible with agents’ limited capacity to control their own character, reasons, and motives.

Ferenc Huoranszki is Professor of Philosophy at Central European University, Philosophy Department. His main research areas include metaphysics and philosophy of action.

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