Game Theory and Fisheries

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A01=Ussif Rashid Sumaila
Author_Ussif Rashid Sumaila
Carbon Capture
Carbon Trading
Catchability Coefficient
Category=KCVG
Climate Change
Coastal Fleet
Coastal Vessels
Conservation
cooperative resource use
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Decreased Discount Rate
Discounting
Environmental Finance
Environmental Policy
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eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Fisheries
fisheries economics
Freezer Trawlers
Game Theory
Global Warming
Ice
Intrinsic Growth Rate
ITQ System
IUU Catch
Longline Fleets
marine protected areas
MENA Region Country
Natural Resources
Net Migration Rate
Non-cooperative Management
non-cooperative strategies
North East Arctic Cod
North East Atlantic Cod
Permit Trading
Purse Seine
renewable resource management
Resource Rent
Small MPA
SSB
stock depletion modelling
Stock Size
strategic interaction in fisheries policy
Subgradient Projection
Sustainability
Sustainable Development
Tuna Stocks
Unprotected Area
Vessel Groups

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415638692
  • Weight: 530g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 21 Aug 2013
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Today, there is a growing sense of urgency among fisheries scientists regarding the management of fish stocks, particularly among those who predict the imminent collapse of the fishing industry due to stock depletion. This book takes a game theoretic approach to discussing potential solutions to the problem of fish stock depletion. Acknowledging the classification of fish stocks as destructible renewable resources, these essays are concerned with the question of how much of the stock should be consumed today and how much should be left in place for the future.

The book targets both economists and students of economics who are familiar with the tools of their trade but not necessarily familiar with game theory in the context of fisheries management. Importantly, the goal is not to give a summary evaluation of the current views of the ‘appropriate’ response to immediate policy questions, but rather to describe the ways in which the problems at hand can be productively formulated and approached using game theory and couched on real world fisheries.

Game Theory and Fisheries consists of twelve previously published but updated articles in fisheries management, a number of which address a gap in the fisheries literature by modelling and analysing the exploitation of fishery resources in a two-agent fishery, in both cooperative and non-cooperative environments. The author’s work ultimately illustrates that the analysis of strategic interaction between those with access to shared fishery resources will be incomplete without the use of game theory.

Ussif Rashid Sumaila is Professor and Director of the Fisheries Economics Research Unit at the University of British Columbia’s Fisheries Centre, Canada. He specializes in bioeconomics, marine ecosystem valuation and the analysis of global issues such as fisheries subsidies; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; and the economics of high and deep seas fisheries.

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