A01=James D. Morrow
Author_James D. Morrow
Backward induction
Bargaining problem
Bayes' theorem
Bayesian
Bayesian game
Bayesian probability
Bounded rationality
Bribery
Calculation
Calculus of voting
Category=JPA
Category=PBUD
Category=PBW
Centipede game
Coalition government
Common knowledge (logic)
Cooperative game
Coordination game
Decision problem
Decision theory
Defection
Economics
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eq_society-politics
Evolutionary game theory
Expected utility hypothesis
Extensive-form game
Folk theorem (game theory)
Foreign policy
Games and Economic Behavior
General equilibrium theory
Grim trigger
Hegemonic stability theory
Incumbent
International political economy
Mathematical economics
Mathematical optimization
Mathematical proof
Median voter theorem
Nash equilibrium
Nuclear strategy
Nuclear warfare
Outcome (game theory)
Paradox of voting
Pareto efficiency
Policy
Political economy
Political party
Political science
Politics
Power transition theory
Preference (economics)
Price war
Principal-agent problem
Prisoner's dilemma
Probability
Probability distribution
Probability theory
Prospect theory
Rational choice theory
Rationality
Rationalizability
Risk aversion
Rubinstein bargaining model
Signaling game
State of the World (book series)
Strategy (game theory)
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Theory of International Politics
Trade barrier
Trade war
Uncertainty
Utility
Voting
Voting behavior
Product details
- ISBN 9780691034300
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 19 Dec 1994
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
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Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence.
An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.
James D. Morrow is Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University.
