George W Bush Administration Propaganda for an Invasion of Iraq

Regular price €51.99
Quantity:
In stock with our UK publisher. 14-28 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
14 days return policy Shipping & Delivery
11 foreign policy
A01=Larry Hartenian
Active WMD Program
Administration's Case
Administration's Propaganda
Administration’s Case
Administration’s Propaganda
Aluminum Tubes
Author_Larry Hartenian
Bush administration
Category=JPSD
Category=NHK
Category=NHWL
CIA Assess
CIA Headquarter
CIA Report
CIA's Interpretation
CIA’s Interpretation
DCI Tenet
Director Of Central Intelligence
EIT
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
IC Analysis
IC Report
Intelligence Information
intelligence manipulation
Iraq's WMD
Iraqi development
Iraqi nuclear weapons program
Iraqi Support
Iraqi WMD Program
Iraq’s WMD
national security policy
National Security Strategy
political communication
post-9
propaganda analysis in US government
Propaganda Case
Regime change
regime legitimacy
Slides Briefing
SSCI
terrorism studies
Top Administration Officials
United States
US invasion
WMD Program

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367558857
  • Weight: 607g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 09 Jan 2023
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns

Hartenian’s history of George W Bush propaganda for an invasion of Iraq returns the administration’s approach to its conceptual origins. Hartenian places "evidence" in the center of his analysis, showing that Rumsfeld’s "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" meant that no evidence was necessary to justify an invasion. The 9/11 attacks, indeed, "changed everything" for the Bush administration and in its aftermath the time for regime change in Iraq had simply come.

With no good evidence to support its fears, the administration was certain of a post-9/11-conceived Iraq–al Qaeda "nexus," just as with no evidence except the "absence of evidence" it was certain of Iraqi mastery of "denial and deception" that hid "Saddam’s" "evil" activities. Resting on Cheney’s "one percent doctrine," administration "certainty" of the threat from Iraq required a US invasion.

The policy offices of Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, with the help of George Tenet at CIA, would generate a case of such fright and enormity—the "mushroom cloud"—that required administration action. Manipulating intelligence and ignoring the growing body of evidence undermining its case, the Bush administration invaded Iraq to bring about "regime change."

Larry Hartenian is Emeritus Professor of Politics and History at Curry College. He has focused in recent years on contemporary history.

More from this author