Groundless Belief

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A. J. Ayer
A01=Michael Williams
Analytic-synthetic distinction
Appearance and Reality
Argument
Author_Michael Williams
Awareness
Axiom
Basic belief
Begging the question
Brute fact
Category=QDTK
Clarence Irving Lewis
Coherentism
Concept
Consciousness
Contradiction
Critique
David Hume
Dichotomy
Disenchantment
Disposition
Empirical evidence
Empiricism
Epistemology
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Explanation
Explication
Fallacy
Falsity
Foundationalism
Gettier problem
Gilbert Harman
Holism
Hypothesis
Idealism
Incorrigibility
Ineffability
Inference
Infinite regress
Inquiry
Logical truth
Materialism
Phenomenalism
Phenomenon
Philosopher
Philosophical Investigations
Philosophy
Philosophy of mind
Prediction
Premise
Principle
Process philosophy
Qualia
Reality
Reason
Reductio ad absurdum
Reductionism
Regress argument
Requirement
Richard Rorty
Skepticism
Suggestion
Symptom
The Philosopher
Theory
Theory of justification
Theory of knowledge (IB course)
Thought
Truth
Uncertainty
Wilfrid Sellars
Willard Van Orman Quine
Writing

Product details

  • ISBN 9780691009070
  • Weight: 255g
  • Dimensions: 140 x 216mm
  • Publication Date: 26 Jul 1999
  • Publisher: Princeton University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism," according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical sense-datum and reductionist form but empiricism generally. Williams examines and rejects the idea that, unless our beliefs are answerable to a "given" element in experience, objective knowledge will be impossible. Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views.
Michael Williams is Charles and Emma Morrison Professor of Humanities at Northwestern University.