Groups as Epistemic and Moral Agents
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Organised groups such as governments, corporations, charities and courts are an integral part of our lives. They provide services, sell goods, employ people, raise taxes, wage wars, and issue legal judgements. In our interactions with them, we routinely ascribe them mental states, speaking of what they know, want and intend. And we use these ascriptions in predicting what groups will do and assessing their responsibility for outcomes. For instance, in morally assessing the government's performance in the coronavirus pandemic, we might ask what the government knew about the virus at key decision points. And in attempting to predict Russia's response to the current war in Ukraine, we might ask what Russia believes about the West's resolve to defend Ukraine.
This book takes these ordinary ways of thinking and talking seriously, assuming that at least some groups are agents with mental states on which they act. In particular, the book examines groups both as epistemic and moral agents providing non-summative accounts of group evidence, group belief, group justified belief, group knowledge, what it is for a group to act or believe for one reason rather than another, and when a group has an excuse for wrongdoing from blameless ignorance. These phenomena are crucial to the evaluation of the beliefs and actions of groups. Whether a group's belief is justified depends on its evidence and the reason for which it believes; whether it's praiseworthy or blameworthy for its actions depends on the reason for which it acted, as well as whether it is blamelessly ignorant of any wrongdoing. By providing a clearer view of central group phenomena, the book will help us assess the beliefs and actions of the powerful groups at work in our lives, whether governments, corporations, public sector bodies or third sector actors.
Jessica Brown is professor of philosophy in the Arché research centre at St Andrews University. Since her Ph.D. at Oxford University, she has worked on a wide range of topics within philosophy of mind, epistemology, the methodology of philosophy, and responsibility. She has published two monographs (Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, MIT 2004; and Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, OUP 2018). In addition, she has co-edited several collections for Oxford University Press (Defeat, Reasons and Justification, 2022; Knowledge Ascriptions, 2012; and Assertion, 2011).