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Half War
Half War
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A01=Robert P Haffa Jr
Army
Author_Robert P Haffa Jr
Category=JP
conventional warfare logistics
CRAF
defense policy planning
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Force Planning
General Purpose Forces
Ground Forces
Half War
half war strategy
Host Nation Support
Indigenous Nuclear Weapons Capability
interservice rivalry analysis
joint operations doctrine
Limited Contingency
limited contingency forces
military force structure
military planning
NATO Area
NATO Europe
NATO Minister
NATO Reinforcement
Naval Forces
Rapid Deployment
Rapid Deployment Capability
rapid deployment command challenges
Rapid Deployment Forces
RDJTF
Ready Reserve Force
REDCOM
Strategic Concept
Strategic Mobility
strategic mobility systems
STRIKE Command
U.S. military forces
Unified Command
Unified Command Plan
unified command structure
Product details
- ISBN 9780367292768
- Weight: 700g
- Dimensions: 144 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 13 Sep 2019
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
This book offers a strategic, organizational, and logistical analysis in a historical context of the planning of conventional forces to meet a limited contingency. The central question is: Why, from 1960 to 1982, did the U.S. fail to construct a coherent limited contingency force? Analysis of a series of comparative case studies reveals that the strategic concept to the "half war," or limited contingency, was never articulated adequately enough to support specific force planning. Organizations designed to oversee and command limited contingency forces, fragmented by interservice rivalries and the absence of joint doctrine, lacked multiservice composition and a unified command structure. A search for economy in limited contingency forces seemed justified by illusions about their capabilities. Low budgetary priority and Congressional perceptions that enhanced U.S. rapid deployment capabilities would encourage U.S. global intervention contributed to the lack of logistical and mobility systems dedicated to them. The wider intent of this study is to shed light on the general purpose force planning process and to suggest policy guidance as the United States once again embarks on a major conventional force planning initiative. Rather than being trapped by the past, new efforts to meet vital U.S. military interests below the nuclear threshold must identify "half war" planning contingencies, structure unified commands capable of directing tailored conventional forces in specific theaters, and provide adequate strategic mobility systems.
Colonel Haffa is associate professor and deputy department head in political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Half War
€107.99
