Algorithmic trading
Alvin E. Roth
Arbitrage
Auction
Auction theory
Bayesian game
Behavioral economics
Bidding
Category=KCA
Coase conjecture
Combinatorial auction
Common value auction
Competitive equilibrium
Consumption (economics)
Coordination failure (economics)
Cost curve
Demand curve
Dictator game
Double auction
Economic efficiency
Economic equilibrium
Economic indicator
Economic power
Economic Theory (journal)
Economics
Economist
Efficient-market hypothesis
Endowment effect
Environmental economics
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Expected utility hypothesis
Experimental economics
Experimental philosophy
Friedman test
Games and Economic Behavior
General equilibrium theory
Learning effect (economics)
Marginal cost
Marginal rate of substitution
Market (economics)
Market liquidity
Market mechanism
Market power
Market price
Modern portfolio theory
Nash equilibrium
Ordinal utility
Pareto efficiency
Predatory pricing
Prediction
Preference (economics)
Price elasticity of demand
Price support
Price war
Probability
Production-possibility frontier
Profit (economics)
Prospect theory
Reservation price
Result
Risk aversion
Shyam Sunder (economist)
Supply (economics)
Supracompetitive pricing
Test statistic
Theoretical Value
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Theory Of Price
Trading strategy
Ultimatum game
Utility
Value (economics)
Product details
- ISBN 9780691058979
- Weight: 1049g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 07 Dec 1997
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E.
Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.
John H. Kagel is Professor of Economics, a Fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science, and Director of the Center for Experimental Economics at the University of Pittsburgh. Alvin E. Roth is A. W. Mellon Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society.
