A01=Gabriel Richardson Lear
Admiration
Analogy
Aporia
Approximation
Aristotelian ethics
Aristotle
Author_Gabriel Richardson Lear
Cardinal virtues
Category=QDHA
Category=QDTQ
Ceteris paribus
Courage
Disposition
Encomium
eq_isMigrated=0
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Ethics
Eudaimonia
Excellence
Existence
Explanation
First principle
Four causes
Generosity
Glaucon
God
Good and evil
Greatness
Hedonism
Human Action
Humility
Inference
Inquiry
Instrumental value
Intellectual virtue
Magnanimity
Metaphor
Morality
Multitude
Nicomachean Ethics
On the Soul
Phaedrus (dialogue)
Philosopher
Philosophy
Phronesis
Platonic love
Political freedom
Posterior Analytics
Potentiality and actuality
Practical reason
Precedent
Premise
Principle
Rationality
Reality
Reason
Requirement
Rhetoric
Self-actualization
Self-esteem
Self-sufficiency
Seminar
Speculative reason
Suggestion
Superiority (short story)
Teleology
The Philosopher
Theory
Theory of Forms
Thought
Thumos
Understanding
Unmoved mover
Virtue
Well-being
Product details
- ISBN 9780691126265
- Weight: 369g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 16 Jan 2006
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life.
Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy.
Gabriel Richardson Lear is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago.
