Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology

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amplification
Anna-Maria Eder
Brian C. Barnett
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collective belief formation
collective moral epistemology
crippled epistemology
Dario Mortini
Debunking Argument
debunking arguments
disagreement
empirical studies of moral belief
epistemic defeat
Epistemic Peer
Epistemic Significance
epistemology
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Eric Sampson
Error Theories
ethical norms
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Folke Tersman
fundamentalism
Genealogical Claims
Higher Order Beliefs
Higher Order Evidence
J. Adam Carter
Jon Robson
Joshua Di-Paolo
Justin Clarke-Doane
level-splitting beliefs
Margaret Greta Turnbull
metaethical skepticism
metaethics
Michael Huemer
Michael Klenk
Moore's Open Question Argument
Moore’s Open Question Argument
moral awareness
Moral Beliefs
Moral Disagreement
Moral Epistemology
Moral Intuitions
Moral Knowledge
moral psychology
moral psychology research
Moral Skepticism
Moral Testimony
moral truth
Neil Sinclair
non-moral evidence
Non-moral Knowledge
Ordinary Moral Beliefs
Paul Silva
Peer Disagreement
peer disagreement analysis
People's Moral Beliefs
People’s Moral Beliefs
Quassim Cassam
rational attitude formation
Reflective Equilibrium
Rik Peels
Sarah McGrath
Skeptical Arguments
third-order evidence
Total Evidence
Trolley Cases

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367343200
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 16 Jan 2020
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book offers a systematic look at current challenges in moral epistemology through the lens of research on higher-order evidence. Fueled by recent advances in empirical research, higher-order evidence has generated a wealth of insights about the genealogy of moral beliefs. Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology explores how these insights have an impact on the epistemic status of moral beliefs.

The essays are divided into four thematic sections. Part I addresses higher-order evidence against morality that comes from sources such as disagreement and moral psychology. Part II covers rebuttals of higher-order evidence against morality. The essays in Part III examine the relevance of higher-order evidence for a broader range of phenomena in moral epistemology, for both individuals and groups, including moral testimony and phenomena of practical concern, such as fundamentalist views about moral matters. Finally, Part IV discusses permissible epistemic attitudes regarding a body of moral evidence, including the question of how to determine the permissibility of such attitudes.

This volume is the first to explicitly address the implications of higher-order evidence in moral epistemology. It will be of interest to researchers and advanced graduate students working in epistemology and metaethics.

Michael Klenk works at the intersection of metaethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. His published papers on these topics in Synthese, Ratio, the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, and the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, among others. He works at Delft University of Technology and held visiting positions at St. Gallen and Stanford University.