How We Blame

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A01=Bana Bashour
agency
agency and punishment distinction
attribution theory
Author_Bana Bashour
Bana Bashour
blame
Category=JM
Category=QDTM
Category=QDTQ
cultural moral norms
dyadic morality
empirical moral psychology
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
experimental philosophy of responsibility
incompatibilism
intent
intentional states
intentionality in ethics
justified attributions
moral judgments
moral psychology
moral responsibility
norm violation perception
personhood
philosophy of psychology
punishment
reflective evaluation

Product details

  • ISBN 9781032522647
  • Weight: 530g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 07 Jul 2025
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book presents a naturalistic account of moral responsibility that is neutral on the metaphysics of free will. It engages with empirical literature in experimental philosophy and psychology and draws on real-life case studies to illuminate the author’s theory of moral responsibility.

The author argues that agency requires an understanding of moral responsibility attributions, which requires that one understands one’s intentional states and those of others. Further, she argues that a justified attribution of moral responsibility involves justified attributions of intentional states and justified perceptions of norm violations. This claim is novel because when moral responsibility is indexed to a particular onlooker, the discussion becomes one about whether a blamer is justified in attributing moral responsibility to the blamed. Another distinctive feature of the author’s account is that it makes room for cultural variability in our justifications of moral responsibility; those in different cultures may have different norms or expectations of one another. The first part of the book argues for a theoretical account of agency and moral responsibility while making distinctions between those and one’s theory of punishment. While justified attributions are interpersonal, theories of punishment are institutional and societal in nature. The second part of the book goes into the literature from empirical psychology and experimental philosophy on the nature of moral responsibility.

How We Blame will appeal to philosophers and psychologists interested in the issue of moral responsibility.

Bana Bashour is Tenured Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of General Education at the American University of Beirut. Her research is at the intersection of the philosophy of mind, ethics and moral psychology. In 2013, She published an edited anthology with Hans Muller entitled Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implication.

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