Hume's Difficulty

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A01=Donald L.M. Baxter
account
Alternate Story
Author_Donald L.M. Baxter
Cantorean Conception
Category=QDHM
Category=QDTJ
Changeable Existence
Churlish Manner
Coexistent Moments
Consciousness's Ideas
distinct
Distinct Existences
Distinct Perceptions
early modern philosophy
Epistemic Possibility
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Felt Connection
Frege's Puzzle
Fregean Solution
Frege’s Puzzle
Hume's Account
Hume's Difficulty
Humean theory of time and self
humes
infinite divisibility
Intended Object
Intentional Object
Metaphysical Taste
metaphysics of consciousness
numerical identity problem
objects
Past Perceptions
personal identity theory
Pyrrhonian skepticism
SBN
simples
single
steadfast
Steadfast Object
Successive Moments
Successive Perceptions
temporal
Temporal Simples
thing
things
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415955942
  • Weight: 362g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 29 Aug 2007
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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In this volume--the first, focused study of Hume on time and identity--Baxter focuses on Hume’s treatment of the concept of numerical identity, which is central to Hume's famous discussions of the external world and personal identity. Hume raises a long unappreciated, and still unresolved, difficulty with the concept of identity: how to represent something as "a medium betwixt unity and number." Superficial resemblance to Frege’s famous puzzle has kept the difficulty in the shadows. Hume’s way of addressing it makes sense only in the context of his unorthodox theory of time. Baxter shows the defensibility of that theory against past dismissive interpretations, especially of Hume’s stance on infinite divisibility. Later the author shows how the difficulty underlies Hume’s later worries about his theory of personal identity, in a new reading motivated by Hume’s important appeals to consciousness. Baxter casts Hume throughout as an acute metaphysician, and reconciles this side of Hume with his overarching Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Donald L. M. Baxter is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut.

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