A01=Fenna H. Poletiek
Author_Fenna H. Poletiek
bias
Card Selections
Category=JMA
Category=JMR
cognitive reasoning
confirmation
Confirmation Bias
Defective Truth Table
discovery
Epistemic Utility
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eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
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eq_society-politics
experimental psychology
Falsification Principle
falsificationism
focal
Focal Hypothesis
Hypothesis Testing Behaviour
Hypothesis Testing Research
Information Bias
Knowledge Acquisition
likelihood
Likelihood Ratio
Matching Bias
Neyman Pearson Theory
Positive Testing Strategy
pragmatic hypothesis evaluation
prior
probability
probability-value model
Rejection Area
rule
Rule Discovery Task
scientific inference
Scientific Knowledge Acquisition
selection
Selection Task
Selection Task Research
Set Size Effect
task
Testing Behaviour
Universal Statement
verificationism
Vice Versa
Wason Experiments
Wason's Task
Product details
- ISBN 9781138877382
- Weight: 272g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 25 Jun 2015
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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How do people search evidence for a hypothesis? A well documented answer in cognitive psychology is that they search for confirming evidence. However, the rational strategy is to try to falsify the hypothesis. This book critically evaluates this contradiction. Experimental research is discussed against the background of philosophical and formal theories of hypothesis testing with striking results: Falsificationism and verificationism - the two main rival philosophies of testing - come down to one and the same principle for concrete testing behaviour, eluding the contrast between rational falsification and confirmation bias.
In this book, the author proposes a new perspective for describing hypothesis testing behaviour - the probability-value model - which unifies the contrasting views. According to this model, hypothesis testers pragmatically consider what evidence and how much evidence will convince them to reject or accept the hypothesis. They might either require highly probative evidence for its acceptance, at the risk of its rejection, or protect it against rejection and go for minor confirming observations. Interestingly, the model refines the classical opposition between rationality and pragmaticity because pragmatic considerations are a legitimate aspect of 'rational' hypothesis testing. Possible future research and applications of the ideas advanced are discussed, such as the modelling of expert hypothesis testing.
