Immaterial Self

Regular price €179.80
A01=John Foster
analysis
Author_John Foster
Basic Subject
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTM
Causal Pairings
Causally Determined
character
Characteristic Functional Role
Dualist Thesis
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
identity
Intrinsic Autonomy
Intrinsic Type
items
Jones's Brain
Jones’s Brain
mental
Mental Items
Mental Realm
Mental Reductionism
Mental Subject
Mental Types
Neural Item
Non-physical Subject
Ordinary Psychological Concepts
Physical Colour
psychological
Psychophysical Causation
Psychophysical Laws
reductionism
reductive
Relevant Functional Role
Single Basic Subject
Smith's Brain
Smith’s Brain
thesis
token
Token Identity Thesis
Total Stream
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415029896
  • Weight: 544g
  • Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
  • Publication Date: 05 Sep 1991
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self.

John Foster's new book exposes the inadequacies of the dominant materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind. In doing so he is in radical conflict with the current philosophical establishment. Ambitious and controversial, The Immaterial Self is the most powerful and effective defence of Cartesian dualism since Descartes' own