Individual Strategy and Social Structure
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Adaptive learning
Aggregate behavior
Aggregate pattern
Almost surely
Author_Hobart Peyton Young
Calculation
Category=KCA
Category=KJC
Common knowledge (logic)
Connectedness
Coordination game
Cost curve
Cross-sectional data
Cumulative distribution function
Currency
Customer
Decision problem
Decision theory
Decision-making
Diagram (category theory)
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Estimation
Expected utility hypothesis
Frequency distribution
Games and Economic Behavior
Human behavior
Institution
Institutional economics
Interaction (statistics)
Learning rule
Likelihood function
Lipschitz continuity
Location model
Markov chain
Markov process
Nash equilibrium
Outcome (game theory)
Pareto efficiency
Poisson point process
Population proportion
Potential game
Precedent
Predictive modelling
Preference (economics)
Prisoner's dilemma
Probability
Probability distribution
Quantity
Rational choice theory
Reinforcement
Reinforcement learning
Result
Rounding
Sample Size
Significant figures
Social behavior
Social capital
Social equilibrium
Social structure
Solution concept
State space
Stochastic
Stochastic approximation
Strategy
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Subsequence
Subset
Systems theory
The Product Space
The Use of Knowledge in Society
Theorem
Utility
Value (economics)
With high probability
Product details
- ISBN 9780691086873
- Weight: 312g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 23 Jan 2001
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
H. Peyton Young is Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at The Johns Hopkins University and a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of Equity: In Theory and Practice (Princeton).
