Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies
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A01=Paul J. Quirk
Activism
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American Enterprise Institute
Appointee
Author_Paul J. Quirk
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Budget process
Budget support
Campaign finance reform in the United States
Career
Category1=Non-Fiction
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Category=JPP
Category=JPQ
Civil service
Clientelism
Commerce Clause
Commerce Commission
Comparative advertising
Consideration
Consumer protection
Consumer spending
Consumerism
Cooling-off period (consumer rights)
COP=United States
Corporate capitalism
Cost-benefit analysis
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Deregulation
Economic interventionism
Economic problem
Economics
Employment
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eq_nobargain
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eq_society-politics
Ethics in Government Act
Ex post facto law
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Election Commission
Federal Power Commission
Government agency
Government Regulation
Interstate Commerce Commission
Language_English
Law firm
Legislation
Liberalism
Lobbying
Management consulting
Management science
Market economy
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National security
Organizational behavior
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Policy
Policy analysis
Political action committee
Political philosophy
Political radicalism
Political science
Political sociology
Politician
Politics
Price_€100 and above
Product design
Product naming
Profit maximization
PS=Active
Public interest
Public policy
Public sphere
Regulation
Regulatory agency
Regulatory capture
Respondent
Social economy
Social responsibility
softlaunch
Subsidy
The Public Interest
Theory of the firm
Trade association
Trade regulation
Trade-off
Welfare economics
Product details
- ISBN 9780691642703
- Weight: 539g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 19 Apr 2016
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Hardback
- Language: English
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Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination, Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United States federal regulatory agencies. Through a series of interviews with high-level officials of the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, he determines whether and what kinds of incentives exist to adopt policies favorable to industry. Originally published in 1981. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
