Informal Credit Markets And The New Institutional Economics

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A01=Sagrario L Floro
Author_Sagrario L Floro
Category=JP
Credit Layering
Credit Reference Checks
Dummy Variable
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Financial Liberalization Policies
Foreign Debt Service Payments
Formal Financial Sector
Group-wise Comparisons
Imputed Wage
Informal Credit
Informal Credit Markets
Informal Financial Intermediation
Informal Lenders
Institutional Economics Approach
Interest Rate Ceilings
Interest Rate Elasticity
Kuhn Tucker Conditions
Land Collateral
Lender Type
Linked Loans
Market Interlinkage
Negative Relationship
Poor Borrowers
Profit Maximization Model
Significant Moral Hazard
Transaction Costs Hypothesis

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367016050
  • Weight: 430g
  • Dimensions: 146 x 222mm
  • Publication Date: 13 Sep 2019
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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The conventional wisdomaboutcreditmarketshas been radically alteredin recent years through the introduction of elements of moral hazard,adverseselectionofrisk,and quality-price relationships. Important empiricalstudies have been published which are leading to vastly different policyimplications. This analysis has not been explicitly extended to informalcredit markets so far, although it is widely recognized that credit transactedoutside the banking circuit is quantitatively huge and qualitatively critical,especially in developing countries.This book combines the new theoretical approach to credit markets withcertain precepts of the New Institutional Economics in order to analyzeinformal credit markets. While the formal financial institutions in developingcountries carry out credit transactions within the limits set by the marketenvironment and by government policies, informal institutions evolve by aparticular selection of modes of economic behavior which are responses tointrinsic imperfections of the market. The informal sector enhances trust bymakingexistingtiesanintegralcomponentofcreditcontracts:thecontractualcomponent of informal credit capitalizes on the personalistic (social andeconomic) relationships between the transacting parties.
Sagrario L. Floro, Pan A. Yotopoulos, Stanford.

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