Intellectual Path Dependence in Economics

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academic time allocation
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Cellular Automaton
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Coase’s Contribution
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error
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Historical Small Events
history of ideas
intellectual history
Intellectual Path Dependence
Intellectual Welfare
Irene Van Staveren
market for ideas
Original Software Package
Path Dependence
persistence of falsified economic theories
philosophy of science
Positive Transaction Costs
Punctuated Equilibrium
replicated failure
Replication Failure
research ethics in economics
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scientific theory persistence
Sophisticated Methodological Falsificationism
St Il
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unreplicated research
Vice Versa
Voluntary Servitude

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138016170
  • Weight: 510g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 21 Mar 2016
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Is economics always self-corrective? Do erroneous theorems permanently disappear from the market of economic ideas? Intellectual Path Dependence in Economics argues that errors in economics are not always corrected. Although economists are often critical and open-minded, unfit explanations are nonetheless able to reproduce themselves. The problem is that theorems sometimes survive the intellectual challenges in the market of economic ideas even when they are falsified or invalidated by criticism and an abundance of counter-evidence.

A key question which often gets little or no attention is: why do economists not reject theories when they have been refuted by evidence and falsified by philosophical reasoning? This book explores the answer to this question by examining the phenomenon of intellectual path dependence in the history of economic thought. It argues that the key reason why economists do not reject refuted theories is the epistemic costs of starting to use new theories. Epistemic costs are primarily the costs of scarcity of the most valued element in academic production: time. Epistemic scarcity overwhelmingly dominates the evolution of scientific research in such a way that when researchers start off a new research project, they allocate time between replicable and un-replicable research.

This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the methodology, philosophy and history of economics.

Altug Yalcintas is an historian and philosopher of economics. He is an Associate Professor at the Economics Department of Ankara University, Turkey.

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