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A01=Helen V. Milner
Amendment
Author_Helen V. Milner
Bretton Woods system
Case study
Category=JPA
Category=JPS
Central bank
Ceteris paribus
Coalition government
Conservative Party (UK)
Consideration
Currency
Dani Rodrik
Debt
Domestic policy
Economic interventionism
Economic policy
Economics
Economy
Endorser
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Exchange rate
Externality
Foreign policy
Free trade
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Government of France
Government of the United Kingdom
Great power
Hegemonic stability theory
Hegemony
Inefficiency
Inflation
Institution
International relations
Legislation
Legislator
Legislature
Liberalization
Maastricht Treaty
Monetary policy
Motion of no confidence
Multilateralism
North American Free Trade Agreement
Parliamentary system
Party discipline
Payment
Policy
Political economy
Political party
Politician
Politics
Polyarchy
Prediction
Probability
Protectionism
Ratification
Referendum
Result
Right-wing politics
Robert Jervis
Sharyn O'Halloran
Supermajority
Tariff
Trade agreement
Trade barrier
Treaty
Two-party system
Unitary state
Veto
Voting
Westphalian sovereignty
World Politics
World War II
Product details
- ISBN 9780691011769
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
- Publication Date: 18 Sep 1997
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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Increasingly scholars of international relations are rallying around the idea that "domestic politics matters." Few, however, have articulated precisely how or why it matters. In this significant book, Helen Milner lays out the first fully developed theory of domestic politics, showing exactly how domestic politics affects international outcomes. In developing this rational-choice theory, Milner argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is ultimately misleading. She describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as a legislature and an executive). Milner constructs a new model based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. She illustrates this model by taking up the critical question of cooperation among nations. Milner examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics.
She shows that it is the outcome of this internal game--not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating--that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists--neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike--have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.
Helen V. Milner is Professor of Political Science and a member of the Institute on War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. She is the author of Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton).
