International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis

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Aleksandr Fursenko
Bomber Command
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Category=JPWS
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Category=NHB
Category=NHK
Category=NHW
Category=NHWL
Christopher Andrew
CIA Headquarter
CIA Team
Cold War diplomacy
Cold War International History Project
Critical Oral History
Cuban crisis
Cuban Missile Crisis
Dead Drop
Dead Letter Boxes
DIA Analyst
DIA Director
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eq_history
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
intelligence analysis methods
international security studies
John F. Kennedy
Jupiter Missiles
military decision making
MRBM Site
NATO Alliance
NATO Council
NATO Country
NATO Designation
NATO Eastwards
NATO Meeting
nuclear crisis historical analysis
nuclear deterrence theory
RAF Bomber Command
RAF Wittering
Sensitive Information
Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
strategic risk assessment
UN

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415732178
  • Weight: 800g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 22 Apr 2014
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This edited volume addresses the main lessons and legacies of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis from a global perspective.

Despite the discoveries of recent research, there is still much more to be revealed about the handling of nuclear weapons before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC). Featuring contributions from a number of eminent international scholars of nuclear history, intelligence, espionage, political science and Cold War studies, An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis reviews and reflects on one of the critical moments of the Cold War, focussing on three key areas.

First, the volume highlights the importance of memory as an essential foundation of historical understanding and demonstrates how events that rely only on historical records can provide misleading accounts. This focus on memory extends the scope of the existing literature by exploring hitherto neglected aspects of the CMC, including an analysis of the operational aspects of Bomber Command activity, explored through recollections of the aircrews that challenge accounts based on official records. The editors then go on to explore aspects of intelligence whose achievements and failings have increasingly been recognised to be of central importance to the origins, dynamics and outcomes of the missile crisis. Studies of hitherto neglected organisations such as the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) both extend our understanding of British and American intelligence machinery in this period and enrich our understanding of key episodes and assessments in the missile crisis. Finally, the book explores the risk of nuclear war and looks at how close we came to nuclear conflict. The risk of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons is evaluated and a new proposed framework for the analysis of nuclear risk put forward.

This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, international history, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.

David Gioe is a PhD candidate at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and previously spent a decade working in the US intelligence community.

Len Scott is Professor of International History and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth University.

Christopher Andrew is Emeritus Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Cambridge and a former visiting Professor of National Strategy and the Harvard University.