A01=Elijah Chudnoff
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
Author_Elijah Chudnoff
automatic-update
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=HPK
Category=HPM
Category=JM
Category=JMR
Category=QDTK
Category=QDTM
COP=United Kingdom
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Language_English
PA=Available
Price_€20 to €50
PS=Active
softlaunch
Product details
- ISBN 9780198777571
- Weight: 324g
- Dimensions: 140 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 01 Sep 2016
- Publisher: Oxford University Press
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
We know about our immediate environment--about the people, animals, and things around us--by having sensory perceptions. According to a tradition that traces back to Plato, we know about abstract reality--about mathematics, morality, and metaphysics--by having intuitions, which can be thought of as intellectual perceptions. The rough idea behind the analogy is this: while sensory perceptions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in concrete reality by making us aware of that reality through the senses, intuitions are experiences that purport to, and sometimes do, reveal how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. In this book, Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends such a view of intuition. He focuses on the experience of having an intuition, on the justification for beliefs that derives from intuition, and on the contact with abstract reality via intuition. In the course of developing a systematic account of the phenomenology, epistemology, and metaphysics of intuition on which it counts as a form of intellectual perception Chudnoff also takes up related issues such as the a priori, perceptual justification and knowledge, concepts and understanding, inference, mental action, and skeptical challenges to intuition.
Elijah Chudnoff is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Miami, where he has taught since receiving his PhD from Harvard University. He works primarily on epistemology and the philosophy of mind. He has published papers on intuition, phenomenal intentionality, theories of knowledge, and cognitive phenomenology.
