A priori and a posteriori
A01=Michael N. Forster
Ad hominem
Aenesidemus
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Ambiguity
Analytic-synthetic distinction
Antinomy
Apperception
Aristotle
Author_Michael N. Forster
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Axiom
Begging the question
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Classical logic
Concept
Consequent
Contradiction
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Correspondence theory of truth
Critical philosophy
Critique
Critique of Pure Reason
David Hume
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Democritus
Direct and indirect realism
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Equipollence (geometry)
Erkenntnis
Existence
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Fallacy
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
Hypothesis
Idealism
Immanuel Kant
Inference
Infinite regress
Kantianism
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Lecture
Liar paradox
Logic
Mathematics
Matter of fact
Morality
Natural science
Objectivity (philosophy)
Ontology
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Paul Guyer
Phenomenalism
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Philosophy
Potentiality and actuality
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Prima facie
Principle
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Pyrrho
Pyrrhonism
Qualia
Reality
Reason
Reductio ad absurdum
Relation of Ideas
Russell's paradox
Science
Sextus Empiricus
Skepticism
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Speculative reason
Suspension of judgment
Syllogism
Theory of justification
Thought
Transcendental arguments
Transcendental idealism
Universality (philosophy)
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Product details
- ISBN 9780691146515
- Weight: 198g
- Dimensions: 140 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 06 Jun 2010
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
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This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is widely recognized that Kant's theoretical philosophy aims to answer skepticism and reform metaphysics--Michael Forster makes the controversial argument that those aims are closely linked. He distinguishes among three types of skepticism: "veil of perception" skepticism, which concerns the external world; Humean skepticism, which concerns the existence of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori knowledge; and Pyrrhonian skepticism, which concerns the equal balance of opposing arguments. Forster overturns conventional views by showing how the first of these types was of little importance for Kant, but how the second and third held very special importance for him, namely because of their bearing on the fate of metaphysics. He argues that Kant undertook his reform of metaphysics primarily in order to render it defensible against these types of skepticism.
Finally, in a critical appraisal of Kant's project, Forster argues that, despite its strengths, it ultimately fails, for reasons that carry interesting broader philosophical lessons. These reasons include inadequate self-reflection and an underestimation of the resources of Pyrrhonian skepticism.
Michael N. Forster is professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. His books include "Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar" (Princeton), "Hegel's Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit", and "Hegel and Skepticism".
