Keeping Tito Afloat

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0-271-01629-9
0-271-02650-2
1945-1960
1948
A01=Lorraine M. Lees
American
Author_Lorraine M. Lees
Category=JPS
Cold War
communism
Comparative Politics
declassified documents foreign
Dulles
Eastern Europeans
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
George F. Kennan
HIstory
Lorraine M. Lees
National Archives
policy
pragmatic and geopolitical policies
Roosevelt
Stalin military and economic aid Secretary of State John Foster
Truman Eisenhower
united states
us
usa
World War II Soviet Union

Product details

  • ISBN 9780271026503
  • Weight: 581g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 15 Apr 1997
  • Publisher: Pennsylvania State University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Keeping Tito Afloat draws upon newly declassified documents to show the critical role that Yugoslavia played in U.S. foreign policy with the communist world in the early years of the Cold War. After World War II, the United States considered Yugoslavia to be a loyal Soviet satellite, but Tito surprised the West in 1948 by breaking with Stalin. Seizing this opportunity, the Truman administration sought to "keep Tito afloat" by giving him military and economic aid. President Truman hoped that American involvement would encourage other satellites to follow Tito's example and further damage Soviet power. However, Lees demonstrates that it was President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who most actively tried to use Tito as a "wedge" to liberate the Eastern Europeans.

By the end of 1958, Eisenhower and Dulles discontinued this "wedge strategy" because it raised too many questions about the ties that should exist between communist, noncommunist, and neutral states. As Tito shrewdly kept the U.S. at arm's length, Eisenhower was forced to accept Tito's continued absence from the Soviet orbit as victory enough. In the period between 1958 and 1960, Lees examines U.S. political objectives that remained after military support for Tito was discontinued. Although use of Yugoslavia as a wedge never fully succeeded, Lees shows how that strategy reflected the pragmatic and geopolitical policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Keeping Tito Afloat utilizes diverse sources including personal interviews with key U.S. and Yugoslav officials, official and private papers and oral histories from the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower libraries, State Department records, some only recently declassified, from the National Archives, and the papers of George F. Kennan and John Foster Dulles.

Lorraine M. Lees is Associate Professor of History at Old Dominion University. She is co-editor of volumes 26 and 27 of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–57.

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