Knowing the Adversary
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A01=Keren Yarhi-Milo
Adolf Hitler
Adviser
Afghanistan
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Anschluss
Appeasement
Author_Keren Yarhi-Milo
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British Armed Forces
Calculation
Case study
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JPS
Civil defense
Cold War
Containment
COP=United States
Counterforce
Credibility
Criticism
Czechoslovakia
Decision-making
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
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Expansionism
Foreign policy
German occupation of Czechoslovakia
German re-armament
Glasnost
Harvard University
Inference
Intelligence agency
Intelligence analysis
Intelligence assessment
Intelligence officer
International relations
Interwar period
John Mearsheimer
Language_English
Leonid Brezhnev
Memoir
Mikhail Gorbachev
Military capability
Military doctrine
Military policy
Military strategy
Munich Agreement
Mutual assured destruction
National security
Nazi Germany
Nazi Party
Neville Chamberlain
Nikita Khrushchev
Nuclear warfare
Nuclear weapon
PA=Available
Political science
Prediction
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PS=Active
Ratification
Remilitarization of the Rhineland
Security dilemma
Sino-Soviet split
softlaunch
Soviet Armed Forces
Soviet Military Power
Soviet Union
Soviet Union-United States relations
Soviet-Afghan War
Superiority (short story)
Team B
Theory of International Politics
Treaty
Uncertainty
United States Department of State
United States Intelligence Community
War
Warsaw Pact
Weapon of mass destruction
World War I
World War II
Writing
Product details
- ISBN 9780691159164
- Weight: 482g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 21 Jul 2014
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
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States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework--called selective attention--that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do.
Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security.
Keren Yarhi-Milo is assistant professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University.
