Knowledge and Belief
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A01=Frederick F. Schmitt
accessibility
Accessibility Internalism
Amalgamated Process
ancient scepticism
antecedent
Antecedent Skepticism
Author_Frederick F. Schmitt
Bedlington Terrier
beliefs
Bright Fancy
Cartesian Skepticism
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTK
challenge
consequent
Consequent Skepticism
demon
Demon Challenge
Discriminate Sense
Epistemic Beliefs
Epistemic Evaluation
epistemology theory
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
externalist approach
Follow
history of epistemic justification
Imaginative Operations
internalism
Justified Belief
justify
Mental Internalism
Narrow Individuation
Perceptual Beliefs
philosophical methodology
reflective knowledge
reliabilism philosophy
Reliable Processes
Reliably Formed
Self-presenting State
Skeptical Challenge
skepticism
Strong Operations
true
True Beliefs
Utility Constraint
Vice Versa
Product details
- ISBN 9780415033176
- Weight: 498g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 12 Mar 1992
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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Knowledge, from Plato onwards, has been considered in relation to justified belief. Current debate has centred around the nature of the justification and whether justified belief can be considered an internal or extenal matter. Epistemological internalists argue that the subject must be able to reflect upon a belief to complete the process of justification. The externalists, on the other hand, claim that it is only necessary to consider whether the belief is reliably formed, and argue that the ability to know by reflection is not required for a justified belief.
In the historical section of this book the three most important epistemologists, Plato, Descartes and Hume, as well as the ancient epistemologies of the stoics, Academics and Pyrhonians, are considered. In reconsidering the history of epistemology the author is led to argue against hte view that internalism is historically dominant. His critique of internalism is then developed into a sustained argument against many of its forms, and he goes onto defend an externalist, reliabilist epistemology.
