Lawlessness and Economics
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A01=Avinash K. Dixit
Arbitration
At Best
Attempt
Auditing (Scientology)
Author_Avinash K. Dixit
Bribery
Calculation
Case study
Category=KCA
Coase theorem
Comparative advantage
Competition
Consideration
Contract
Credibility
Creditor
Customer
Discounts and allowances
Dispute resolution
Economic equilibrium
Economics
Economist
Economy
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Externality
Extortion
Formal contract
Fraud
Free entry
Free rider problem
Good governance
Governance
Hold-up problem
Incentive
Incentive compatibility
Income
Inference
Information asymmetry
Institution
Intangible property
Intermediary
Lagrange multiplier
Law and economics
Mechanism design
Nash equilibrium
Negotiation
New institutional economics
Opportunism
Payment
Plaintiff
Policy
Predation
Prisoner's dilemma
Probability
Rational choice theory
Relational contract
Reputation
Result
Right to property
Seigniorage
Self-governance
Sicilian Mafia
Static analysis
Technology
Theft
Theory
Title (property)
Trade association
Trade-off
Transaction cost
Transition economy
Uncertainty
Zero-profit condition
Product details
- ISBN 9780691130347
- Weight: 28g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 13 May 2007
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them.
The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems.
Avinash K. Dixit is John J. F. Sherrerd '52 University Professor of Economics at Princeton University. He is the author or coauthor of nine books, including "Investment under Uncertainty" (Princeton), "Thinking Strategically" (Norton), "Games of Strategy" (Norton), and "The Making of Economic Policy" (MIT).
