Leaders, Factions and the Game of Intra-Party Politics

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A01=Andrea Ceron
Author_Andrea Ceron
cabinet
Category=JPHL
Category=JPL
Centralized Candidate Selection
Close List PR
CMP Data
comparative politics
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Estimated Policy Positions
European party systems
Fractional Logit Model
Gamson's Law
Gamson’s Law
General Elections Approach
Influence Party Positions
internal party conflict resolution
intra-party
Intra-party Dynamics
Intra-party Politics
leadership survival
List PR
Non-credible Threat
OLS Regression
Open List Electoral System
Open List PR
Pareto Set
party factionalism
party factions
party leader
Party's Electoral Performance
Party’s Electoral Performance
PD Faction
Policy Payoffs
political decision making
political parties
Portfolio Allocation
PSOC
Semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards Model
text analysis methods
textual analysis
UK Conservative Party
Unfair Proposal
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138550001
  • Weight: 520g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 25 Apr 2019
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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The book provides a comprehensive view on the internal life of parties and investigates the dynamics of intra-party politics in different party environments to explain in which circumstances the party leader is more or less bound by the wills of party factions.

Analyzing almost 500 intra-party documents from Italy, Germany and France, it presents a theory of intra-party politics that illuminates internal decision-making processes and sheds light on the outcomes of factional conflicts on the allocation of payoffs within the party, on the risk of a party split and on the survival of the party leader. Using text analysis, the results show that consensual dynamics can allow to preserve party unity and that directly elected leaders can exploit their larger autonomy either to reward followers or to prevent splits.

This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of Party Politics, Political Institutions, European Politics and more broadly to Comparative Politics, Political Theory and Text Analysis.

Andrea Ceron is Assistant Professor at the Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Milan, Italy.

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