1997 Asian financial crisis
A01=Randall W. Stone
Austerity
Author_Randall W. Stone
Boris Yeltsin
Bribery
Budget
Budget crisis
Capital control
Capital flight
Capital market
Category=JPQ
Category=JPS
Category=KCL
Category=KCP
Category=KFFK
Central bank
Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Creative accounting
Credibility
Credit (finance)
Credit crunch
Credit rationing
Currency
Currency board
Currency crisis
Debt overhang
Devaluation
Economic planning
Economic policy
Economics
Economy of Russia
Economy of Ukraine
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Exchange rate
Export restriction
Finance
Financial crisis
Fiscal adjustment
Fiscal policy
Foreign direct investment
Government bond
Government debt
High-yield debt
Indexation
Inflation
Inflation targeting
Interest rate
Internal devaluation
International Monetary Fund
Investment
Investor
Liberalization
Macroeconomics
Microeconomic reform
Monetarism
Monetary policy
New Economic Policy
North American Free Trade Agreement
Pigovian tax
Price controls
Privatization
Pyramid scheme
Real versus nominal value (economics)
Recession
Restructuring
Ruble
Russian financial crisis (2014-present)
Speculation
Structural adjustment
Subsidy
Tax
Tax holiday
Tax reform
Tight Monetary Policy
Too big to fail
Tranche
Yegor Gaidar
Product details
- ISBN 9780691095295
- Weight: 425g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 14 Jul 2002
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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With the end of the Cold War, the International Monetary Fund emerged as the most powerful international institution in history. But how much influence can the IMF exert over fiercely contested issues in domestic politics that affect the lives of millions? In Lending Credibility, Randall Stone develops the first systematic approach to answering this question. Deploying an arsenal of methods from a range of social sciences rarely combined, he mounts a forceful challenge to conventional wisdom. Focusing on the former Soviet bloc, Stone finds that the IMF is neither as powerful as some critics fear, nor as weak as others believe, but that the answer hinges on the complex factor of how much credibility it can muster from country to country. Stone begins by building a formal, game-theoretic model of lending credibility, which he then subjects to sophisticated quantitative testing on original data from twenty-six countries over the 1990s. Next come detailed, interview-based case studies on negotiations between the IMF and Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Bulgaria.
Stone asserts that the IMF has exerted startling influence over economic policy in smaller countries, such as Poland and Bulgaria. However, where U.S. foreign policy interests come more heavily into play, as in Russia, the IMF cannot credibly commit to enforcing the loans-for-policy contract. This erodes its ability to facilitate enduring market reforms. Stone's context is the postcommunist transition in Europe and Asia, but his findings carry implications for IMF activities the world over.
Randall W. Stone is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. He is the author of "Satellites and Commissars" (Princeton).
