A01=Lars Udehn
anthony
Author_Lars Udehn
Buchanan's Constitutional Economics
Buchanan’s Constitutional Economics
business
Category=JHM
Category=JPA
Category=KCP
Civil Society
Collective Action
Collective Action Problem
Collective Behaviour
collective behaviour theory
Collective Goods
Cooperative Game Theory
cycles
De Jasay
downs
economic
economic voting behaviour
Emile Durkheim
empirical political analysis
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Fireman
Foul Dealing
Impartial Spectator
interdisciplinary critique of public choice
james
Mancur Olson's Theory
Mancur Olson’s Theory
Methodological Individualism
Michael Hechter
Olson's Theory
Olson’s Theory
Pocketbook Voting
political
Political Business Cycles
political economy critique
Political Sociology
Public Choice
Public Choice Theory
rational
rational choice analysis
Resource Mobilization Approach
Selective Incentives
Sociological Man
sociological methodology
sociology
Sociotropic Voting
theory
Product details
- ISBN 9780415125123
- Weight: 860g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 07 Dec 1995
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
Public choice has been one of the most important developments in the social sciences in the last twenty years. However there are many people who are frustrated by the uncritical importing of ideas from economics into political science. Public Choice uses both empirical evidence and theoretical analysis to argue that the economic theory of politics is limited in scope and fertility. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of political life, political scientists must learn from both economists and sociologists.
