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Logic and Social Choice (RLE Social Theory)

Yasusuke Murakami
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Arrow's Condition
Arrow's Theorem
Arrow’s Condition
Author_Yasusuke Murakami
Auxiliary Function
Category=JB
Category=JBF
Category=JHBA
collective choice modelling
decision
decisions
Direct Democracy
electoral paradoxes
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eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
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eq_society-politics
Faithful Representation
Finite Ranking Operator
function
General Possibility Theorem
individual
jth
Jury Decision
logical foundations of voting behaviour
majority
making
many-valued logic
Pairwise Comparison
paradox
Piecemeal Comparison
Preference Hold
Preference Intensity
Preliminary Lemma
Quorum Rule
representative democracy comparison
RLE
Round Robin Process
simple
Simple Majority Voting
Social Decision
Social Decision Function
social decision theory
Social Indifference
Strong Monotonicity
Unanimity Rule
Vice Versa
voting
Voting Operator
Voting Paradox
voting systems analysis

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138980013
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 27 Jan 2017
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Description

How is a social decision made out of individual members' decisions? This is one of the primary questions in the social sciences. Logic and Social Choice provides an answer to the topic by the application of mathematical logic. Yasusuke Murakami formulates social decision-making in logical terms, and shows that an analysis of social decision is equivalent to a logical calculus in many-valued logic. The logical conditions are then derived for various types of societies, especially for democracy. This foundation enables the author to discuss such topics as the relation between direct democracy and the representative system, a comparison of various rules of election, and the stability of social decision. The main conclusion is that inconsistency or paradox is inherent not only in voting and in democracy itself, but also in any piecemeal social decision-making.

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