Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics
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A01=G. Tabellini
A01=T. Persson
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Author_G. Tabellini
Author_T. Persson
budget
Capital Levy
Category=KCB
Concavity Index
constraint
constraints
Credibility Constraints
Discretionary Equilibria
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
equilibrium
Equilibrium Inflation
Equilibrium Policy
fiscal policy credibility
game theory economics
government
Government Budget Constraint
Government Optimization Problem
Government Policy Rule
incentive
Incentive Compatibility Condition
Incentive Constraint
Incomplete Information Model
Infinite Horizon
inflation
institutional economics
Lump Sum Tax
monetary
monetary policy analysis
Monetary Policy Model
Optimal Monetary Policy Rule
Policy Surprise
political economy research
Pooling Equilibrium
public debt management
Reputational Equilibria
strategic policymaking in macroeconomics
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Supply Shock
surprise
Surprise Inflation
Unexpected Inflation
wage
Wage Setters
Product details
- ISBN 9780415269254
- Weight: 530g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 06 Dec 2001
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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Uses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches.
Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, Jean-Michel Grandmont
