Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic
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1972
A01=III
A01=Samuel Merrill
Abstention
Activism
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
Approval voting
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Author_III
Author_Samuel Merrill
automatic-update
Ballot
Bayesian probability
Borda count
Candidate
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=JPH
Category=JPQ
Centrism
Condorcet criterion
Condorcet method
Conservative Democrat
Coombs' method
COP=United States
Counterexample
Cumulative voting
Decision rule
Decision theory
Delivery_Pre-order
Duverger's law
Election
Elections in the United States
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
Equal footing
Expected value
First-preference votes
Front-runner
General election
III
Inference
Instant-runoff voting
Language_English
Logistic regression
Major party
Majority rule
Mathematical optimization
Minor party
Monotonicity criterion
Monte Carlo method
Multi-party system
Multivariate normal distribution
Nash equilibrium
Negative campaigning
Normal distribution
Optimal decision
PA=Temporarily unavailable
Pairwise comparison
Paradox of voting
Party leader
Party leaders of the United States House of Representatives
Plurality voting system
Political party
Political science
Politician
Populism
Predictive power
Price_€20 to €50
Primary election
Probability
Probability distribution
Proportional representation
PS=Active
Public choice
Ranking (information retrieval)
Sincere voting
softlaunch
Standard score
Statistical significance
Two-party system
Uniform distribution (discrete)
United States presidential election
United States presidential primary
Utility
Voting
Voting behavior
Voting system
Weighted arithmetic mean
With high probability
Product details
- ISBN 9780691604626
- Weight: 28g
- Dimensions: 178 x 254mm
- Publication Date: 14 Jul 2014
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
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This book addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory--the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. Such procedures can differ strikingly in the election outcomes they produce, the opportunities for manipulation that they create, and the nature of the candidates--centrist or extremist--whom they advantage. The author uses computer simulations based on models of voting behavior and reconstructions of historical elections to assess the likelihood that each multicandidate voting system meets political objectives. Alternative procedures abound: the single-vote plurality method, ubiquitous in the United States, Canada, and Britain; runoff, used in certain primaries; the Borda count, based on rank scores submitted by each voter; approval voting, which permits each voter to support several candidates equally; and the Hare system of successive eliminations, to name a few. This work concludes that single-vote plurality is most often at odds with the majoritarian principle of Condorcet.
Those methods most likely to choose the Condorcet candidate under sincere voting are generally the most vulnerable to manipulation. Approval voting and the Hare and runoff methods emerge from the analyses as the most reliable. Originally published in 1988. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
