A01=Pierre-Andre Chiappori
abortion
Age Group_Uncategorized
Age Group_Uncategorized
allocation
applied economics
assortative matching
Author_Pierre-Andre Chiappori
automatic-update
bargaining models
Becker-Coase theorem
birth control
Category1=Non-Fiction
Category=KCA
Choo-Siow model
comparative statics
COP=United States
cupid framework
Delivery_Delivery within 10-20 working days
divorce
econometrics
education
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
equilibrium
family economics
family formation
female empowerment
Gale-Shapley algorithm
gender differences
hedonic equilibrium
hedonic models
heterogeneity
heterogeneous products
heteroskedasticity
higher education
household behavior
imperfectly transferable utility
income
individual utilities
inequality
intrafamily allocation
intrahousehold allocation
labor markets
Language_English
Low model
marriage
marriage market
matching
matching models
metric spaces
multidimensional matching
nontransferable utility
optimal transportation
organ donations
PA=Available
Pareto weights
positive assortative matching
preinvestment
Price_€20 to €50
PS=Active
remarriage
risk sharing
Roe v. Wade
roommate matching
separability assumption
softlaunch
Spence-Mirrlees condition
stability
supermodularity
transferable utility
transfers
wages
Product details
- ISBN 9780691203508
- Dimensions: 156 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 26 May 2020
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
- Language: English
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Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets to organ donations, but recent work has tended to focus on "nontransferable" cases rather than matching models with transfers. In this important book, Pierre-André Chiappori fills a gap in the literature by presenting a clear and elegant overview of matching with transfers and provides a set of tools that enable the analysis of matching patterns in equilibrium, as well as a series of extensions. He then applies these tools to the field of family economics and shows how analysis of matching patterns and of the incentives thus generated can contribute to our understanding of long-term economic trends, including inequality and the demand for higher education.
Pierre-André Chiappori is the E. Rowan and Barbara Steinschneider Professor of Economics at Columbia University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics at the University of Chicago. He is the author or coauthor of several books, including Economics of the Family.
