Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation

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A01=Martin Spraggon
A01=Virginia Bodolica
Acquisition Premium
Antitakeover Defense
Author_Martin Spraggon
Author_Virginia Bodolica
Category=KC
Category=KFFH
Category=KJC
Category=KJK
Category=KJMV
Category=KJU
Category=KJVB
Ceo Incentive
Ceo Pay
Ceo Power
Control Premiums
corporate governance
Cumulative Abnormal Returns
EBC
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Executive Accountability
Executive Compensation
Executive Compensation Packages
Executive Pay
executive pay during mergers and acquisitions
Executive Pay Package
Exercisable Options
Golden Parachutes
Illiquidity Discount
incentive alignment
managerial agency theory
Managerial Equity Ownership
Managerial Stock Ownership
Merger Influence
Mergers and Acquisitions
organizational behavior research
Pay For Performance
Restricted Stock
Restricted Stock Awards
shareholder value analysis
Stock Option Pay
Stock Return Volatility
takeover defense strategies
Target Executive
Target Shareholders

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138617964
  • Weight: 340g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 229mm
  • Publication Date: 08 Jun 2018
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Over the past decades, the total value of executive compensation packages has been rising dramatically, contributing to a wider pay gap between the chief executive officer and the average worker. In the midst of the financial turmoil that brought about a massive wave of corporate failures, the lavish executive compensation package has come under an intense spotlight. Public pressure has mounted to revise the levels and the structure of executive pay in a way that will tie more closely the executive wealth to that of shareholders. Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities represent an opportune setting for gauging whether shareholder value creation or managerial opportunism guides executive compensation. M&As constitute major examples of high-profile events prompted by managers who typically conceive them as a means for achieving higher levels of pay, even though they are frequently associated with disappointing returns to acquiring shareholders.

Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation reviews the existing empirical evidence and provides an integrative framework for the growing body of literature that is situated at the intersection of two highly debated topics: M&A activities and executive compensation. The proposed framework structures the literature along two dimensions, such as M&A phases and firm’s role in a M&A deal, allowing readers to identify three main streams of research and five different conceptualizations of causal relationships between M&A transactions and executive compensation.

The book makes a comprehensive review of empirical studies conducted to date, aiming to shed more light on the current and emerging knowledge in this field of investigation, discuss the inconsistencies encountered within each stream of research, and suggest promising directions for further exploration. This book will appeal to researchers and students alike in the fields of organizational behavior and governance as well as accounting and accountability.

Virginia Bodolica is Associate Professor of Management at American University of Sharjah, School of Business and Management, UAE.

Martin Spraggon is Associate Professor of Management at American University of Sharjah, School of Business and Management, UAE.

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