Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage

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A01=Nomy Arpaly
Affection
Ambivalence
Analogy
Author_Nomy Arpaly
Bildungsroman
Category=QDTQ
Category=QDTS
Causal chain
Causality
Compatibilism
Concept
Conscience
Consideration
Counterexample
Counterintuitive
Deed
Deontological ethics
Determination
Determinism
Discipline
Disposition
Duty
Empathy
Epistemic virtue
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Ethics
Explanation
Factitious disorder
Generosity
Grandiosity
I Wish (manhwa)
Inference
Inferiority complex
Kleptomania
Materialism
Mind control
Moral character
Moral luck
Moral obligation
Moral psychology
Moral responsibility
Morality
Motivation
Narcissism
Narrative
Obscenity
On Virtue
Oppression
Ought implies can
Peer pressure
Person
Pessimism
Philosopher
Philosophy of mind
Practical reason
Rationality
Reason
Recreation
Result
Reward system
Rhetorical device
Self-authorship
Self-control
Self-love
Social conscience
Sophistication
Symptom
Theory
Thought
Train of thought
Truism
Value (ethics)
Value theory
Wishful thinking

Product details

  • ISBN 9780691124339
  • Weight: 369g
  • Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
  • Publication Date: 06 Aug 2006
  • Publisher: Princeton University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Hardback
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Perhaps everything we think, feel, and do is determined, and humans--like stones or clouds--are slaves to the laws of nature. Would that be a terrible state? Philosophers who take the incompatibilist position think so, arguing that a deterministic world would be one without moral responsibility and perhaps without true love, meaningful art, and real rationality. But compatibilists and semicompatibilists argue that determinism need not worry us. As long as our actions stem, in an appropriate way, from us, or respond in some way to reasons, our actions are meaningful and can be judged on their moral (or other) merit. In this highly original work, Nomy Arpaly argues that a deterministic world does not preclude moral responsibility, rationality, and love--in short, meaningful lives--but that there would still be something lamentable about a deterministic world. A person may respond well to reasons, and her actions may faithfully reflect her true self or values, but she may still feel that she is not free. Arpaly argues that compatibilists and semicompatibilists are wrong to dismiss this feeling--for which there are no philosophical consolations--as philosophically irrelevant. On the way to this bittersweet conclusion, Arpaly sets forth surprising theories about acting for reasons, the widely accepted idea that "ought implies can," moral blame, and more.
Nomy Arpaly is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Brown University and the author of "Unprincipled Virtue".

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