A01=Richard Double
Author_Richard Double
Capital Punishment Scores
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTQ
character
Character Virtues
Commonsense Moralities
Complete Moral Theories
Complete Physical Theory
desiderata
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Error Theory
ethical relativism
ethics
Follow
Hold
hurka
Ideal Observer Theory
Impartial Moral Theories
impartiality in ethics
Innocent Defendants
intuitions
Metaethical Subjectivism
moral
Moral Desideratum
moral disagreement
moral epistemology
Moral Intuitions
Moral Judgments
Moral Obligation
Moral Pluralism
Nonmoral Judgments
normative
Normative Ethics
normative theory analysis
Objective Moral Knowledge
Objective Moral Truths
obligation
Perspectival Argument
philosophical methodology
Simple Subjectivism
Slippery Slope Arguments
thomas
Violate
virtues
worldview approach to moral theory
Product details
- ISBN 9781138263017
- Weight: 260g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 06 Mar 2017
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
Secure
checkout
Fast Shipping
Easy returns
Metaethical subjectivism, the idea that the truth or falsity of moral statements is contingent upon the attitudes or conventions of observers, is often regarded as a lurid philosophical doctrine which generates much psychological resistance to its acceptance. In this accessible book, Richard Double, presents a vigorous defense of metaethical subjectivism, arguing that the acceptance of this doctrine need have no deleterious effects upon theorizing either in normative ethics or in moral practice. Proceeding from a 'worldview' methodology Double criticizes the rival doctrine of metaethical objectivism for lacking both 'completeness' and 'soundness', argues that a defense of metaethical subjectivism requires no special semantic analysis of moral language and defends the plausibility of metaethical subjectivism as explaining key intractable disagreements in moral philosophy. Double concludes by suggesting that the acceptance of metaethical subjectivism is better for constructing theories of normative ethics and moral practice than is metaethical objectivism.
Dr Richard Double has written The Non-Reality of Free Will, Metaphilosophy and Free Will, and Beginning Philosophy. He has also written over 50 articles and 20 reviews. Upon retirement he was full professor of philosophy and chair at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, and voted University Researcher of the Year for 2003-04.
