Home » Military History of the English Civil War
Product Image

Military History of the English Civil War

Malcolm Wanklyn | Frank Jones
€192.20
Quantity:
In stock with our UK publisher. 14-28 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
14 days return policy Shipping & Delivery
A01=Frank Jones
A01=Malcolm Wanklyn
army
association
Author_Frank Jones
Author_Malcolm Wanklyn
Category=NHB
Category=NHD
cavalry
Circuitous
civil conflict studies
eastern
Eastern Association
English Civil War military leadership
eq_bestseller
eq_history
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
Essex's Army
essexs
Essex’s Army
field
Field Army
Great Civil War
King's Army
King's Field
King's Field Army
King's Infantry
kings
King’s Army
King’s Field
King’s Field Army
King’s Infantry
Lewis Dyve
Manchester's Army
Manchester’s Army
Marston Moor
Midday
military decision analysis
Model Army
Nathaniel Fiennes
North Hampshire
Ouse Valley
parliamentary strategy
regiment
resource allocation in war
royalist command structure
Royalist Field Armies
Royalist High Command
Royalist Infantry
Scottish Army
seventeenth century warfare
Sir Lewis Dyve
South Central England
thames
Thames Valley
Trained Bands
valley

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138176300
  • Weight: 453g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 07 Dec 2016
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns
Description

A Military History of the English Civil War examines how the civil war was won, who fought for whom, and why it ended. With a straightforward style and clear chronology that enables readers to make their own judgements and pursue their own interests further, this original history provides a thorough critique of the reasons that have been cited for Parliament's victory and the King's defeat in 1645/46. It discusses the strategic options of the Parliamentary and Royalist commanders and councils of war and analyses the decisions they made, arguing that the King’s faulty command structure was more responsible for his defeat than Sir Thomas Fairfax's strategic flair. It also argues that the way that resources were used, rather than the resources themselves, explain why the war ended when it did.

More from this author