Military History of the New World Disorder, 1989-2022 Volume 78
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The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 freed the world of the political and military perils and imperatives of the Cold War. But it also introduced a whole new constellation of risks and challenges, as Jonathan M. House brings into sharp relief in A Military History of the New World Disorder, 1989–2022, the third and final volume in his comprehensive trilogy of military developments around the globe since the Second World War.
What followed the breaking of the Cold War’s grip on global affairs was not so much a new world order as a new world disorder, as the United States and its allies suddenly found themselves without the sort of coherent grand strategy previously deployed to contain the Soviet Union. Focusing largely but not exclusively on the US, House surveys subsequent developments in military strategy and operations—the processes by which politicians and military leaders of the major powers designed, organized, resourced, and then employed military forces to conduct or deter conflicts. His overview ranges from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to American interventions in Panama, Somalia, former Yugoslavia, and Haiti; Israel vs. Hezbollah in Lebanon; and the resurgence of the Russian military in Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine. Throughout, House provides a compelling analysis of recent military developments, including the strengths and weaknesses of employing precision-guided munitions, counter-insurgency techniques, and other controversial methods of current warfare. His work reveals the complex relationship between national political decisions to commit armed forces to conflicts and the results on the battlefield—and offers a timely perspective on military power and practice in the current day.
What followed the breaking of the Cold War’s grip on global affairs was not so much a new world order as a new world disorder, as the United States and its allies suddenly found themselves without the sort of coherent grand strategy previously deployed to contain the Soviet Union. Focusing largely but not exclusively on the US, House surveys subsequent developments in military strategy and operations—the processes by which politicians and military leaders of the major powers designed, organized, resourced, and then employed military forces to conduct or deter conflicts. His overview ranges from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to American interventions in Panama, Somalia, former Yugoslavia, and Haiti; Israel vs. Hezbollah in Lebanon; and the resurgence of the Russian military in Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine. Throughout, House provides a compelling analysis of recent military developments, including the strengths and weaknesses of employing precision-guided munitions, counter-insurgency techniques, and other controversial methods of current warfare. His work reveals the complex relationship between national political decisions to commit armed forces to conflicts and the results on the battlefield—and offers a timely perspective on military power and practice in the current day.
Jonathan M. House is Professor Emeritus at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, Kansas. He is author of Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century and Military Intelligence, 1870–1991 and coauthor, with David M. Glantz, of several studies of the Soviet-German conflict during World War II.