Militia Order in Afghanistan

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A01=Matthew P. Dearing
Afghan Border Police
Afghan Government Officials
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
Afghanistan war
Alp
Andar District
Andar Residents
Author_Matthew P. Dearing
Category=GTU
Category=JP
Category=JW
Central Government
CIP Program
community accountability mechanisms
Community Defenders
Competitive Patronage
counterinsurgency strategies
Diag Program
East Timor
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
gangsterism
Ghazni
Ghazni Province
Ghulam Nabi
Hezbi Islami
local orders
local power dynamics
Loya Paktia
militia behaviour case studies
militias
NATO Force
NDS.
NGO Interview
non-state armed groups
paramilitary governance
protection
QRF
security sector reform
Special Squad
State Patrons
Village Stability Operations
warlords
Young Man

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367710453
  • Weight: 380g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 19 Jul 2021
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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This book offers a new insight into when and why paramilitary groups in Afghanistan engage in protective or predatory behavior against the civilians they purportedly defend.

In Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency environment, America leaned on militias to provide order and stabilize communities cut off from weak central government institutions. However, the lucrative market of protection challenged militia loyalty, as many engaged in banditry, vendettas, and predation. This book examines the varying militia experiments in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020 and their outcomes through three sub-national case studies. It argues that successful militia experiments in Afghanistan involved inclusion of local orders, where communities had well-established social structures and accountability mechanisms in place, and state patrons relied upon those structures as a restraint against militia behavior. Complementary management ensured patrons leaned on communities for strong accountability systems. But such environments were far from the norm. When patrons ignored community controls, militias preyed on civilians as they monopolized the market of protection. This book adds to the rich literature on the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, but differs by focusing on the interplay between states, communities, and militias.

This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, Asian politics, security studies and International Relations.

Matthew P. Dearing is an Associate Professor of Regional and Analytical Studies at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University.

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