Models of Imperfect Information in Politics
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A01=R. Calvert
asymmetric information politics
Author_R. Calvert
Bayesian equilibrium
Bounded Rationality Models
Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem
Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem
CAL
Candidate Equilibrium
Candidate Platforms
Candidate Uncertainty
Category=JP
eq_bestseller
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
eq_society-politics
equilibrium
Euclidean Preferences
full
Full Information Model
ideal
Imperfect Information
Issue Space
Majority Rule Equilibrium
Mixed Strategies
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
nash
Nash Equilibrium
pareto
Pareto Set
Participation Game
Perfect Information Model
points
political game theory
political science methodology
probabilistic
Probabilistic Voting
Pure Strategy Equilibrium
rational choice analysis
set
signalling models
Smooth
strategic decision making under uncertainty
Uninformed Voter
voter
Voter Ideal Points
Voter Learning
Voter Uncertainty
voting
Voting Costs
Product details
- ISBN 9780415753708
- Weight: 158g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 24 Jul 2015
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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Surveys the models of political phenomena that incorporate imperfect information, concentrating on 'full-rationality' approaches as opposed to bounded rationality models.
