Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition
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A01=K. Shepsle
Admissible Objectives
advanced multiparty election research
agents
Author_K. Shepsle
backward
Backward Induction Argument
Bayesian Equilibrium
Category=KCP
conjectural
Duverger's Law applications
endogenous agent modelling
eq_bestseller
eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
eq_non-fiction
equilibrium
government formation studies
Hierarchical Equilibrium
Higher Quality Candidate
hotelling
Hotelling Model
induction
Infinite Horizon Game
Interior Firm
Limit Equilibrium
Location Vector
Low Quality Candidate
mill
Multiparty Electoral Competition
nash
Nash Equilibrium
Open Seat
party system analysis
Peripheral Firms
Plurality Maximization
Plurality Voting Rule
political science theory
Preference Revelation
Price Reaction Functions
Prospective Entrant
Single Member District
spatial
spatial voting models
Strategic Voting
Subgame Perfect Equilibria
variation
Voter Distribution
Voter Ideal Points
Product details
- ISBN 9780415269452
- Weight: 370g
- Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
- Publication Date: 06 Dec 2001
- Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Hardback
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