Moral Disagreement

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A01=Rach Cosker-Rowland
A01=Richard Rowland
Agnostic
applied ethics analysis
argument
Author_Rach Cosker-Rowland
Author_Richard Rowland
Basic Liberal Rights
Category=QD
Category=QDTQ
Category=QDTS
Civic Friendship
Conceptual Role Semantics
conciliationism
deliberative democracy
Epistemic Peers
Epistemic Significance
epistemology
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Error Theory
ethics
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Genuine Moral Disagreements
Interpretation Argument
Liberalism
Mackie
metaethics
Moral Caution
Moral Disagreement
Moral Error Theory
Moral Principles
moral realism
moral uncertainty in policy
Non-cognitivism
non-ideal theory
Non-moral Beliefs
Non-objectivist Views
normative
Objective Moral Facts
Objective Moral Reality
Parfit
Peer Disagreement
peer epistemology
philosophy of law
political legitimacy debates
PR
public reason theory
Rawlsian PR
relativism
Robust Realism
Vice Versa
Wide Reflective Equilibrium
Widespread Moral Disagreement

Product details

  • ISBN 9781138589858
  • Weight: 440g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 26 Nov 2020
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Paperback
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Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance, does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate?

In this thorough and clearly written introduction to moral disagreement and its philosophical and practical implications, Rach Cosker-Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions:

  • How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives?
  • Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peers
  • Metaethics and moral disagreement
  • Relativism, moral objectivity, moral realism, and non-cognitivism
  • Moral disagreement and normative ethics
  • Liberalism, democracy, and disagreement
  • Moral compromise
  • Moral uncertainty.

Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and suggestions for further reading, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, and philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism and scepticism. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as ethics and public policy and philosophy of law.

Rach Cosker-Rowland is an Associate Professor in the School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science at the University of Leeds, UK. They are the author of The Normative and the Evaluative (2019), and the co-editor of Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (Routledge, 2019).

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