A01=Hossein Dabbagh
Author_Hossein Dabbagh
Category=QDTQ
emotion
empirical moral psychology
epistemological intuitionism
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intellectual seemings
Moral Epistemology
moral intuition
Moral Intuitionism
non-doxastic states
non-inferential justification
quasi-perceptualism
self-evidence
Product details
- ISBN 9781350297616
- Weight: 420g
- Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
- Publication Date: 27 Jun 2024
- Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
- Publication City/Country: GB
- Product Form: Paperback
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Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism.
His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience.
Hossein Dabbagh is Assistant Professor in Applied Ethics at New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK, and Philosophy Tutor at the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK.
