Moral Nexus

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A01=R. Jay Wallace
Accountability
Analogy
Attempt
Author_R. Jay Wallace
Awareness
Beneficiary
Bernard Williams
Bodily integrity
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTQ
Causality
Concept
Consequentialism
Consideration
Contradiction
Controversy
Conventional wisdom
Decision-making
Deliberation
Deontological ethics
Discretion
Disposition
Divine command theory
Duty
Eo ipso
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Ethics
Exertion
Explanation
Feeling
Generosity
Good and evil
Gratitude
Hypothesis
Inference
Intention (criminal law)
Joseph Raz
Lecture
Leeway
Modern Moral Philosophy
Moral absolutism
Moral agency
Moral injury
Moral obligation
Moral reasoning
Moral responsibility
Morality
Normative ethics
Obligation
Oxford University Press
Phenomenon
Philippa Foot
Philosopher
Practical reason
Principle
Private law
Rationality
Reason
Relational model
Requirement
Resentment
Result
Rights
Skepticism
Social relation
Suggestion
Theory
Theory of justification
Third-party beneficiary
Thought
Utilitarianism
Value theory
Voluntarism (philosophy)
Well-being

Product details

  • ISBN 9780691264837
  • Dimensions: 156 x 235mm
  • Publication Date: 17 Dec 2024
  • Publisher: Princeton University Press
  • Publication City/Country: US
  • Product Form: Paperback
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A new way of understanding the essence of moral obligation

The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing.

The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms.

The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.

R. Jay Wallace is the Judy Chandler Webb Distinguished Chair in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Normativity and the Will, and The View from Here: On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret.

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