Moral Responsibility

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A01=Carlos Moya
agency theory
Agent's Moral Responsibility
Agent’s Moral Responsibility
alternative
Alternative Possibilities Condition
argument
ascriptions
Author_Carlos Moya
belief and action
Bob's Decision
Bob’s Decision
Category=QD
causal determinism
Classical Compatibilism
cognitive approach ethics
compatibilism
condition
Conditional Analysis
control
Counterfactual Intervener
Deserve Praise
Dilemma Defence
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
Evaluative Beliefs
Evaluative Views
Frankfurt Cases
free will debate
Freedom Relevant Condition
incompatibilist
Incompatibilist Argument
inwagen
Kane's Theory
Kane’s Theory
Material Conditional
Moderate Reasons Responsiveness
Moral Responsibility
Moral Responsibility Ascriptions
philosophical scepticism responsibility
possibilities
Rule Beta
True Desert
Truth Evaluable Content
ultimate
Ultimate Control
Ultimate Control Condition
van
Van Inwagen
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9780415371957
  • Weight: 620g
  • Dimensions: 156 x 234mm
  • Publication Date: 09 Feb 2006
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
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We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility - the idea that certain human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief under suspicion, and there are important reasons for thinking that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, therefore potentially rendering it an impossibility.

Presenting the major arguments for scepticism about moral responsibility, and subjecting them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis, Moral Responsibility lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. A well-written and lively account, the book then goes on to suggest a way in which scepticism can be avoided, arguing that excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at its root.

Offering an alternative to this scepticism, Carlos Moya shows how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility that stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

University of Valencia, Italy

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