Motivation and the Primacy of Perception
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological notion of motivation advances a compelling alternative to the empiricist and rationalist assumptions that underpin modern epistemology.
Arguing that knowledge is ultimately founded in perceptual experience, Peter Antich interprets and defends Merleau-Ponty's thinking on motivation as the key to establishing a new form of epistemic grounding. Upending the classical dichotomy between reason and natural causality, justification and explanation, Antich shows how this epistemic ground enables Merleau-Ponty to offer a radically new account of knowledge and its relation to perception. In so doing, Antich demonstrates how and why Merleau-Ponty remains a vital resource for today's epistemologists.
Peter Antich is visiting assistant professor of philosophy at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut. His publications include “Merleau-Ponty on Hallucination and Perceptual Faith,” in Études Phénoménologiques – Phenomenological Studies, “Perceptual Experience in Kant and Merleau-Ponty,” in the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, and “Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Concept Formation,” in the History of Philosophy Quarterly.