Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation
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A01=Nathan M. Jensen
Author_Nathan M. Jensen
Bond credit rating
Business cycle
Capital control
Category=KCL
Central bank
Central government
Corporate tax
Democracy and economic growth
Dependency theory
Developed country
Economic development
Economic globalization
Economic growth
Economic indicator
Economic interventionism
Economic policy
Economics
Economy
Endogenous growth theory
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eq_business-finance-law
eq_isMigrated=0
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
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Export credit agency
Export Development Canada
External Economies Of Scale
Financial Times
Fiscal federalism
Fiscal policy
Foreign corporation
Foreign direct investment
Foreign trade of the United States
Global Competitiveness Report
Globalization
Government revenue
Government spending
Industry Group
Institution
International Finance Corporation
International Monetary Fund
Investment
Investment Climate
Investment promotion agency
Investor
Investor relations
Liberalization
Macroeconomic Factor
Monetarism
Multilateral Agreement on Investment
Multinational corporation
National Policy
Neoclassical economics
New trade theory
North American Free Trade Agreement
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Political economy
Political risk insurance
President (corporate title)
Race to the bottom
Return on capital
Sovereign Risk
State capture
State-owned enterprise
Tax
Tax avoidance
Tax holiday
Tax incentive
Tax incidence
Tax law
Tax rate
Tax reform
Use tax
World Bank
World economy
World Trade Organization
Product details
- ISBN 9780691136363
- Weight: 312g
- Dimensions: 152 x 235mm
- Publication Date: 10 Feb 2008
- Publisher: Princeton University Press
- Publication City/Country: US
- Product Form: Paperback
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What makes a country attractive to foreign investors? To what extent do conditions of governance and politics matter? This book provides the most systematic exploration to date of these crucial questions at the nexus of politics and economics. Using quantitative data and interviews with investment promotion agencies, investment location consultants, political risk insurers, and decision makers at multinational corporations, Nathan Jensen arrives at a surprising conclusion: Countries may be competing for international capital, but government fiscal policy--both taxation and spending--has little impact on multinationals' investment decisions. Although government policy has a limited ability to determine patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, political institutions are central to explaining why some countries are more successful in attracting international capital. First, democratic institutions lower political risks for multinational corporations. Indeed, they lead to massive amounts of foreign direct investment.
Second, politically federal institutions, in contrast to fiscally federal institutions, lower political risks for multinationals and allow host countries to attract higher levels of FDI inflows. Third, the International Monetary Fund, often cited as a catalyst for promoting foreign investment, actually deters multinationals from investment in countries under IMF programs. Even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements are associated with much lower levels of FDI inflows.
Nathan M. Jensen is assistant professor of political science at Washington University in St. Louis.
