Nature of Things

Regular price €179.80
Quantity:
In stock with our UK publisher. 14-28 days
Delivery/Collection within 10-20 working days
14 days return policy Shipping & Delivery
A01=Anthony M. Quinton
abstract entities in analytic philosophy
Abstract Singular Terms
Albert Memorial
Appetitive Statements
Author_Anthony M. Quinton
Bundle Theory
Category=QDTJ
Category=QDTK
certainty
Coherence Theory
Direct Realism
dualism
Epistemological Priority
epistemology
epistemology of perception
eq_isMigrated=1
eq_isMigrated=2
eq_nobargain
idealism
identity
Incorrigible Statements
individuation
individuation theory
Infinitely Divisible
Irreducibly Intentional
Justified Belief
knowledge
Logical Intuition
Logical Relation
Logically Distinct
materialism
materialism debate
metaphysics
metaphysics of substance
modern philosophy
morality
Non-logical Terms
ontology
Past Tenses
perception
Perceptual Situation
personal identity philosophy
phenomenalism
philosophy language
philosophy of being
philosophy of God
philosophy of matter
philosophy of mind
philosophy of nature
philosophy of self
philosophy psychology
philosophy religion
philosophy science
Popper's Logik Der Forschung
Popper’s Logik Der Forschung
Predicative Terms
Pure Ego Theory
Sense Datum Theory
Singular Terms
Theoretical Entities
Thing's Properties
Thing’s Properties
truth
ultimates
universals and particulars
values philosophy
Vice Versa

Product details

  • ISBN 9780367193935
  • Weight: 910g
  • Dimensions: 138 x 216mm
  • Publication Date: 11 Mar 2019
  • Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
  • Publication City/Country: GB
  • Product Form: Hardback
Secure checkout Fast Shipping Easy returns

Originally published in 1973. In this systematic treatise, Anthony Quinton examines the concept of substance, a philosophical refinement of the everyday notion of a thing. Four distinct, but not unconnected, problems about substance are identified: what accounts for the individuality of a thing; what confers identity on a thing; what is the relation between a thing and its appearances; and what kind of thing is fundamental, in the sense that its existence is logically independent of that of any other kind of thing? In Part 1, the first two problems are discussed, while in Part 2, the third and fourth are considered. Part 3 examines four kinds of thing that have been commonly held to be in some way non-material: abstract entities; the un-observable entities of scientific theory; minds and their states; and, finally, values. The author argues that theoretical entities and mental states are, in fact, material. He gives a linguistic account of universals and necessary truths and advances a naturalistic theory of value.

More from this author